Abstract-There are several analytical results on distributed hash tables (DHTs) that can tolerate Byzantine faults. Unfortunately, in such systems, operations such as data retrieval and message sending incur significant communication costs. For example, a simple scheme used in many Byzantine fault-tolerant DHT constructions of n nodes requires O(log 3 n) messages; this is likely impractical for real-world applications. The previous best known message complexity is O(log 2 n) in expectation; however, the corresponding protocol suffers from prohibitive costs owing to hidden constants in the asymptotic notation and setup costs.
I. INTRODUCTION
The peer-to-peer (P2P) paradigm is a popular approach to providing large-scale decentralized services. However, the lack of admission control in many such systems makes them vulnerable to malicious interference [1] , [2] . This is a practical concern since large-scale P2P systems are in existence today such as the Azureus DHT [3] and the KAD DHT [4] , each of which see more than one million users per day. In addition to file sharing, there are proposals for using P2P systems to protect archived data [5] and re-implement the Domain Name System [6] ; such applications would likely benefit from increased security.
There are a number of results on P2P systems that can provably tolerate Byzantine faults [7] - [14] . This includes the Sybil attack [15] although for ease of exposition, we refer to a Byzantine adversary throughout this work; our results can also be used in conjunction with some proposals specific to the Sybil attack (see the survey of [16] ). To date, the majority of results pertain to distributed hash tables (DHTs). A common technique in DHTs that tolerate adversarial faults is the use of quorums which are sets of peers such that a minority of the members suffer adversarial faults. A quorum replaces an individual peer as the atomic unit. Adversarial behavior can be overcome by majority action allowing for communication between correct peers; we call this robust communication.
Since critical operations such as data queries are performed in concert by members of a quorum, robust communication must be efficient.
Several protocols using quorums have been proposed; however, there is a common theme in the way such quorums are utilized. A message m originating from a peer p traverses a sequence of quorums Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . , Q ℓ until a destination peer is reached. A typical example is a query for content where the destination is a peer q holding a data item. Initially p notifies its own quorum Q 1 that it wishes to transmit m. Each peer in Q 1 forwards m to all peers in Q 2 . A peer in Q 2 determines the correct message by majority filtering on all incoming messages and, in turn, sends to all peers in the next quorum. This forwarding process continues until the quorum Q ℓ holding p is reached. Assuming a majority of correct peers in each quorum, transmission of m is guaranteed. Unfortunately, this simple protocol is costly. If all quorums have size s and the path length is ℓ, then the message complexity is ℓ·s 2 . Typically, s = Θ(log n) and, as in Chord [17] , ℓ = O(log n) which gives a O(log 3 n) message complexity which is likely prohibitively expensive for practical values of n.
Saia and Young [10] give a randomized protocol which provably achieves O(log 2 n) messages in expectation. While communication between two quorums incurs an expected constant number of messages, the analysis in [10] yieldsof size at most s, there are two protocols for achieving robust communication of a message m to a set of peers D ⊆ Q i for some quorum Q i over a path of length ℓ.
Our Robust Communication Protocol I (RCP-I) has the following properties:
• The total message complexity (number of messages sent and received) and the message complexity of the sending peer is each at most 2 · s + 4 · s · (ℓ − 2) + |D|.
• The message complexity of every non-sending peer along the lookup path is at most 4.
• The latency (number of roundtrip communication rounds ) is at most 2 · (ℓ − 2) + 2.
For our Robust Communication Protocol II (RCP-II):
• The expected total message complexity and the expected message complexity of the sending peer is each at most 2 · s + (ℓ−2)
(1−ǫ)·c + (ℓ − 2) + |D|.
• The expected message complexity of a non-sending peer on the lookup path is at most 2 (1−ǫ)·c·s .
• The expected latency is at most (ℓ−2) (1−ǫ)·c + 2. Here, the constant c > 0 is the probability that the response time of a correct peer is at most ∆.
Using the Chord-based construction of [11] , the message complexity of RCP-I is O(log 2 n) and for RCP-II it is O(log n) in expectation. We tolerate a large fraction of adversarial peers; strictly less than a 1/3-fraction compared to the roughly 1/4-fraction in [10] . Our use of a distributed key generation (DKG) scheme allows for security without a trusted party or costly updating of public/private keys outside of each quorum. This obviates the need for a trusted third party. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first use of DKG in a Byzantine-tolerant P2P setting.
Finally, we provide microbenchmark results involving two quorums using PlanetLab. Our experimentation demonstrates that our protocols perform well under significant levels of churn and faulty behaviour. In particular, for a 10 5 -node system with ℓ = 20, our results imply RCP-I and RCP-II complete in under 4 seconds and 5 seconds, respectively.
II. RELATED WORK
A large body of literature exists on implementing Byzantine protocols. While P2P systems do not align perfectly with the state machine replication (SMR) paradigm [19] , the large body of literature on Byzantine fault-tolerant replication is relevant to our work. Early work by Reiter [20] yielded protocols for Byzantine agreement and atomic broadcast. Our first protocol shares some common features with the multicast protocol of [20] , yet we differ significantly since in the P2P domain we must contend with issues of scalability, churn, and spurious requests aimed at consuming resources. More recently, Castro and Liskov [21] demonstrated efficient Byzantine fault-tolerant SMR; however, this seems unsuitable for a P2P setting due to scaling issues. Several other Byzantine fault-tolerant systems have been implemented such as SINTRA [22] , FARSITE [23] , the Query/Update protocol [24] and the HQ system [25] ; however, scalability issues make the use of these protocols in a P2P setting unlikely.
Two implemented large-scale Byzantine fault tolerant storage architectures are OceanStore [26] and Rosebud [27] . The latter scales up to tens of thousands of nodes and handles changing membership. However, with only a single Byzantine node per replication group, Rosebud incurs significant overhead. In contrast, our protocols perform efficiently with 10% of the peers being Byzantine. Rosebud relies on a configuration service (CS) which tracks system membership, ejects faulty nodes, and handles new nodes. The CS, implemented over a set of nodes, introduces a potential bottleneck and a possible point of attack; similarly, a "primary tier" of replicas is used in OceanStore. In contrast, our protocol is completely decentralized and no special set of nodes is required.
Both Rodrigues, Kouznetsov and Bhattacharjee [28] and Rodrigues, Liskov and Shrira [29] give proposals for applying the SMR approach on a large scale; the latter describes a P2P system. However, both works rely on a CS and neither provides empirical results or discusses the details of secure data retrieval and message passing. Wang et al. [30] design and implement a routing scheme that tolerates Byzantine faults and yields good performance. However, they require both a certificate authority (CA) and a special set of nodes, called a neighborhood authority, similar to a CS.
There are several theoretical results on Byzantine faulttolerant DHTs [7] , [11] - [13] . These results make use of quorums, which are sets of Θ(log n) peers such that a majority of the peers in a quorum are correct. Awerbuch and Scheideler show how to maintain quorums [7] - [9] . Saia and Young [10] demonstrate more efficient robust communication but, as discussed earlier, several issues remain unresolved.
Castro et al. [31] , Halo [32] , and Salsa [33] handle Byzantine faults by routing along multiple diverse routes. The proposal in [31] requires a CA whereas we do not rely on any trusted third party. In both [32] and [33] , the guarantees are unclear against an adversary who owns a large IP-address space or targets identifiers over time as described in [7] . In contrast, defenses for quorum-based protocols are known [7] - [9] . Finally, the ShadowWalker system [34] routes securely using the notion of multiple "shadows" which are similar to a quorum; however, our protocols differ significantly.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
Each peer p is assumed to have a unique identifier, p ID , and a network address, p addr . Byzantine peers are also referred to as faulty or adversarial; all other peers are called correct. A fraction of the correct peers may crash due to a system failure or leave gracefully. We model such peers as having crashed.
We adopt an asynchronous communication model with unbounded message delivery time. However, for liveness in DKG and in our second protocol, we use a weak synchrony assumption by Castro and Liskov [35] .
Peers p and q are said to communicate directly if each has the other in its routing table. The target of m is a set of peers D within a single quorum; m may be a data item request and D may consist of a single peer or multiple peers depending on how data is stored.
A. The Quorum Topology
There are several different approaches to how quorums are created and maintained [7] , [10] , [12] ; we refer the reader to [11] for a detailed explanation. Despite these different approaches, we may view the setup of quorums as a graph where nodes correspond to quorums and edges correspond to communication capability between quorums; we refer to this as the quorum topology. Figure 1 illustrates how quorums can be linked in a DHT such as Chord. Peers will likely have different views of the network and hence membership lists for Q i may differ for two peers; however, such issues can be overcome (for example, see [11] ). We assume the following four simple invariants are true: 1) Goodness: each quorum has size s = Ω(log n) and possesses at most an ǫ-fraction of Byzantine peers for ǫ < 1/3. 2) Membership: every peer belongs to at least one quorum. 3) Intra-Quorum Communication: every peer can communicate directly to all other members of its quorums. 4) Inter-Quorum Communication: if Q i and Q j share an edge in the quorum topology, then p ∈ Q i may communicate directly with any member of Q j and vice-versa. These four invariants are standard in the sense that previous works on quorums in DHTs ensure they hold with probability nearly equal to 1. For example, results for maintaining the goodness invariant in DHTs are known [7] - [9] . In terms of the membership invariant, there exist quorum topologies where a peer may belong to several different quorums simultaneously [11] , [12] . Finally, to the best of our knowledge, no implementation of a quorum topology exists; this represents another gap between theory and practice. A number of challenges remain in bridging this gap and such an endeavor is outside the scope of this current work. However, the literature suggests that, with the proper deployment, maintaining these four invariants in real-world DHTs is plausible.
B. Assumptions
The adversary is assumed to have full knowledge of the network topology and control all faulty peers, which forms a constant fraction of all nodes in the system. In concert with the goodness invariant, strictly less than 1/3 of the peers in any quorum can be faulty. These peers may collude and coordinate their attacks. Our adversary is computationally bounded with a security parameter κ and it has do 2 κ computation to break the security of the Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) problem [36] in an appropriate group.
Our protocols guarantee successful transmission of a message; however, feasibility is not enough. Our protocols must be efficient, both in terms of (1) the costs incurred by correct peers for legitimate network operations and (2) the costs incurred by adversarial behavior. The latter concern is crucial since it does no good to provide solutions that allow the adversary to easily launch costly attacks. We first discuss the cryptographic techniques for gaining efficiency and then elaborate on points (1) and (2).
C. Threshold Cryptography
We use threshold cryptography to authenticate messages. The idea behind an (η, t)-threshold scheme is to distribute a secret key among η parties in order to remove any single point of failure. Any subset of more than t parties can jointly reconstruct the secret key or perform the required computation securely in the presence of a Byzantine adversary which controls up to t parties. We use threshold signatures to authenticate the communication between quorums. Threshold Signatures: In an (η, t)-threshold signature scheme, a signing (private) key k is distributed among η parties by a trusted dealer using a verifiable secret sharing protocol [37] or by a completely distributed approach using a DKG protocol [38] . Along with private key shares k i for each party, the distribution algorithm also generates a verification (public) key K and the associated public key shares K. To sign a message m, any subset of t + 1 or more parties use their shares to generate the signature shares σ i . Any party can combine these signature shares to form a message-signature pair S = (m, σ) = [m] k that can be verified using the public key K; however, this does not reveal k. We refer to a message-signature pair S as a signature. It is also possible to verify σ i using the public key shares K. We assume that no computationally bounded adversary that corrupts up to t parties can forge a signature
Further, malicious behavior by up to t parties cannot prevent generation of a signature. Here, we use the threshold version [39] of the Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) signature scheme [36] secure under the GDH assumption (see [18] for more details).
Distributed Key Generation (DKG):
In absence of a trusted party in the P2P paradigm, we use a DKG scheme to generate the (distributed) private key. An (η, t)-DKG protocol allows a set of η nodes to construct a shared secret key k such that its shares k i are distributed over the nodes and no coalition of fewer than t nodes may reconstruct the secret; no trusted dealer is required. There is also an associated public key K and a set of public key shares K for verification.
The protocol in [40] is the first DKG for an asynchronous setting; therefore, it is uniquely suitable for deployment in a P2P network. Along with a Byzantine adversary, this protocol also tolerates crash failures. For a quorum of size s = η, with t Byzantine nodes and f correct nodes that can crash, the DKG protocol requires that s ≥ 3t + 2f + 1. In our case, this security threshold holds due to the goodness invariant in Section III-A. The DKG protocol allows for system dynamics without changing the system public key K and this can be done efficiently by batching; details are given in Section V-B.
D. Spamming Attacks
A critical concern is that the adversary may launch spurious communications aimed at consuming resources; we refer to such behavior as spamming. For example, a malicious peer may initiate a number of data retrieval requests [1] , [2] . Here the situation is more dire since the impact of such attacks is multiplied by the group action in a quorum-based system.
Ultimately, there is no perfect defence against an adversary with the resources to initiate massive spamming attacks (or denial-of-service (DoS) attacks; see the extended version [18] for more discussion) and this is not our focus. Rather we show that our protocols do not afford the adversary an advantage in launching such attacks. Our goal is to prevent the adversary from forcing a peer to perform expensive operations with impunity. For any operation initiated by a spammer p, this can be accomplished by either (A) placing the bulk of the cost of executing said operation on p or (B) making the detection of spamming inexpensive. As we will show in Section IV, our protocol RCP-1 in Section IV-A employs principle (A) while our protocol RCP-II in Section IV-B employs principle (B).
In addition to cryptographic techniques, we assume a rule set to reduce the impact of spamming attacks as introduced by Fiat et al. [11] . A rule set defines acceptable behavior in a quorum; for example, the number of data lookup operations a peer may execute per duration of time. Such rules are known to everyone within a quorum and can be implemented at the software level or agreed upon by quorum members. Requests from a peer that deviates from the rule set are ignored by the other members of its quorum.
E. Efficiency (Not Feasibility) Through Cryptography: The Prove-and-Verify Scenario
We now discuss the merits of employing cryptographic techniques. In the presence of Byzantine peers, no single peer can be trusted. Quorums are employed to overcome this trust deficit through majority action. Using the simple protocol outlined in Section I, transmission of a message is guaranteed.
Therefore, quorums allow for robust communication without the need for cryptographic techniques.
However, spamming attacks still pose a critical problem. For example, a group of Byzantine peers may pretend to be a quorum and initiate requests. Therefore, simply obeying a request because it appears to come from a quorum does not prevent spamming. A standard fix is that a quorum responds only to requests that are "proven" to be legitimate. Yet, there is a cost to proving legitimacy; we explore this to motivate our protocols. First, we expand on the utility of a quorum topology in proving legitimacy. We then show how cryptographic techniques improve the efficiency of this task.
Utility of the Quorum Topology:
We compare two general scenarios in order to demonstrate the utility of a quorum topology in proving requests legitimate. The first assumes that proofs and verifications are required to initiate operations; call this the prove-and-verify scenario. The second assumes no proof is required before acting (although, each peer may keep a record of misbehaving peers); call this the passive scenario. P2P systems often lack admission control and, if forced to leave the system, a Byzantine peer may simply rejoin the network with a new identity. In the worst case, perpetual and rapid rejoin operations result in a DoS attack. Therefore, we make the standard assumption that there is a cost for joining the network (for example, monetary costs as in [31] or CAPTCHAs as suggested in [33] ). The best method of enforcing this cost is beyond the scope of this work.
Let τ denote the rate at which p can issue spurious requests before being forced to rejoin the system. In the passive scenario, a Byzantine peer p can contact any quorum Q i by colluding with other faulty peers to obtain necessary routing information. Members of Q i act on any request coming from p. Therefore, a correct peer may be required to maintain O(n) records so that spam requests are ignored. Moreover, here τ is large due to the abundance of potential targets. In contrast, in a prove-and-verify system the members of Q i must verify p's proof before acting. Proof and verification may take different forms. For instance, constructions exist where two peers communicate only if their respective quorums are linked [11] , [12] ; that is, the quorum topology itself acts as proof. Verification occurs by having a quorum Q i act on p's request only if each peer in Q i receives messages from a majority in Q p . Here τ is smaller; however, there are still shortcomings to this method of proof and verification.
Efficiency in the Prove-and-Verify Scenario: We argue two things: (1) the form of proof discussed above is restrictive and (2) verification is expensive. First, the proof is restrictive since for Q i and Q j to communicate without sending through intermediary quorums, they must maintain links to one another; such maintenance is costly. Second, the verification process is expensive because when communication occurs from Q i to Q j , a correct peer q ∈ Q j must know to which peers in Q i it must listen; this incurs more maintenance costs. These are two significant problems with existing schemes.
Cryptography allows us to improve asymptotically on the message complexity of verification. Under our protocols, each quorum has a public and private key established using DKG. Communication can occur between any two quorums that know and can verify each other's public key. Therefore, the form of proof is not as restricted by the quorum topology and we exploit this in RCP-II. Furthermore, verification is cheaper; using O(s) messages in RCP-I or O(1) expected messages in RCP-II. Of course, overhead is incurred by using cryptography. Message sizes increase by an additional O(κ) bits and keys shares, but not the key itself, must be updated
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when membership changes. However, our experimental results in Section V show that this overhead is tolerable since the computation costs are significantly smaller than the network latency. Hence, cryptography provides a more efficient and flexible implementation of the prove-and-verify scenario.
IV. OUR ROBUST COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS
We propose two robust communication protocols: RCP-I and RCP-II. Here we outline a general scheme in Figure 2 that is later refined to give our two protocols. Consider a sending peer p who wishes to send a message m to peer q. We assume m is associated with a key value which yields information necessary for distributed routing; that is, the next peer to which m should be forwarded is always known. Peer p notifies its quorum Q 1 that it is performing robust communication and receives PROOF(Q 1 ). Peer p sends this to Q 2 as proof that p's actions are legitimate; the form of this proof is discussed later. Depending on the scheme, one or more members of Q 2 examines the proof and, upon verifying it, sends to p: (1) routing information for Q 3 and (2) PROOF(Q 2 ), that will convince Q 3 that p's actions are legitimate. This continues iteratively until p contacts the quorum holding q and m is delivered. We employ the following concepts:
Quorum Public/Private Keys: Each quorum Q i is associated with a (distributed) public/private key pair (K Qi , k Qi ); however, there are two crucial differences between how such a key pair is utilized here in comparison to traditional implementations. First, only those quorums linked to Q i in the quorum topology, and not everyone in the network, need to know K Qi . Second, (K Qi , k Qi ) is created using the DKG protocol and K Qi is the associated set of public key shares.
Individual Public/Private Key Shares: Each peer p ∈ Q i possesses a private key share (k Qi ) p of k Qi produced using DKG. Unlike the quorum public/private key pair of Q i which must be known to all quorums to which Q i is linked in the quorum topology, only the members of Q i need to know the corresponding public key shares K Qi , which plays an important role in allowing members of Q i to verify that the signature share sent to peer p is valid. p verifies if S Qi is valid using K Qi .
7:
if (S Qi is invalid) then 8: p sends signature shares to each peer in Q i . Final Step:
RCP-I: RECEIVING PEER q ∈ Q i Initial Step: 1: if (q ∈ Q 1 receives a request by p) then 2: q checks that a request by p does not violate the rule set. If the request is legitimate, q sends its signature share to p. Intermediate Steps: 3: if (q receives S Qi−1 and ts i from p) then 4: q verifies a S Qi−1 using K Qi−1 and validates ts i ; if successful, q sends its signature share, K Qi+1 and routing information for Q i+1 to p. 5: if (q receives signature shares from p) then 6: q verifies all shares using public key shares and informs p of invalid shares. 
A. Robust Communication Protocol I
We now illustrate RCP-I for a peer p who wishes to send a message m. The path m takes through quorums is denoted by Q 1 , ..., Q ℓ . We assume that p ∈ Q 1 and the target of the message is a set of peers D ⊆ Q ℓ . Overview: We outline RCP-I; the pseudocode is given in Figure 3 . Initially, the correct peers of Q 1 must acquiesce to p's request. Peer p begins by sending [p ID |p addr |key|ts 1 ] to all peers in its quorum Q 1 . The value key corresponds to the intended destination of m and ts 1 is a time stamp. The message m can also be sent, and its hash can be added inside the signature below; however, for simplicity, we assume m is sent only in the last step. Each correct peer q ∈ Q 1 then consults the rule set and sends its signature share to p if p is not in violation. Peer p interpolates these signature shares to generate the signature:
In each intermediate step i = 2, ..., ℓ − 1, p sends its most recent signature S i−1 and a new time stamp ts i to each peer q ∈ Q i along the lookup path. Since Q i is linked to Q i−1 in the quorum topology, each q knows the public key K Qi−1 to verify S i−1 . If S i−1 is verified and ts i is valid, q sends back its signature share, K Qi+1 and the routing information. Peer p collects the shares to form S i and majority filters on the routing information for Q i+1 . In terms of majority filtering, both group membership and the corresponding routing information are agreed upon using DKG. Finally, for Q ℓ , p sends m along with S ℓ−1 to peers in the set D.
Share Corruption Attack: Note the following attack: a set of Byzantine peers B Q i send invalid shares to p and, therefore, p will fail to construct S i . We refer to this attack as the share corruption attack. Here, the individual public/private key shares play a crucial role. To obtain S i , p sends the received shares to each peer in Q i using one message per peer. For a share sent to p by a peer in Q i , each correct peer in Q i verifies the share using K Qi . All valid shares are then sent back to p who creates S i . While members of Q i may identify those peers which p alleges sent an incorrect share, punitive action is limited since p could be Byzantine. Note that the shares are not recomputed; hence, the adversary can only perform this attack once per step.
Lemma 1. RCP I guarantees that m is transmitted to a target set of peers D ⊆ Q i for some quorum Q i over a path of length ℓ with the following properties:
• Both the total message complexity and the message complexity of the sending peer is each at most 2 · s + 4 · s · (ℓ − 2) + |D|.
• Each non-sending peer has message complexity at most 4 messages.
• The latency is at most 2 · (ℓ − 2) + 2.
For our proof, refer to our extended version [18] .
Spamming Attacks:
The sending peer p experiences more cost than other participating peers. In part, this is due to the iterative nature of the protocol; however, largely this is because p must send and receive O(s) messages per step. In contrast, other participating peers need only send and receive a constant number of messages over the execution of the protocol. Peer p may misbehave in other ways. For instance, p may repeatedly contact its quorum to initiate robust communication; however, eventually all correct peers will ignore p. Similarly, using a correct signature, p may repeatedly ask q in another quorum for proof and/or routing information; however, time stamps limit such replay attacks. In conclusion, such actions cannot cause correct peers to perform expensive operations.
B. Robust Communication Protocol II
RCP-II is randomized yielding a small expected message complexity for both the sending peer and non-sending peers. In exchange, join and leave operations incur additional cost in comparison to RCP-I; we discuss this in Section IV-C.
RCP-II utilizes signed routing table information. As a concrete example, we assume a Chord-like DHT although other DHT designs can be accomodated. For a peer u ∈ Q i , each entry of its routing table has the form [Q j , p ID , p
Here p ∈ Q j and p ′ ∈ Q j−1 where (1) Q i links to Q j and Q j−1 in the quorum topology, (2) Q j−1 immediately precedes Q j clockwise in the identifier space and (3) p and p ′ are respectively located clockwise of all other peers in Q j and Q j−1 . K Qj is the quorum public key of Q j , and ts is a time stamp for when this entry was created. Note that any point in the identifier space falls between unique points p ID and p ′ ID . Given this property, and that entries are signed by a quorum, any attempt by a malicious peer along the lookup path to return incorrect routing information can be detected. RT Qj denotes the routing table information for all peers in Q j . [K Q j ] kQ i is the quorum public key of Q j signed using the private quorum key of Q i ; recall, neighbors in the quorum topology know each others' public key. [RT Qj ] kQ i is the routing information signed with the private key of Q i ; entries of the routing table are signed separately. Routing table information is time stamped and re-signed periodically when DKG is executed.
Overview:
We sketch RCP-II here. For simplicity, we temporarily assume that peers act correctly; our pseudocode in Figure 4 is complete for when peers fail to respond to requests by p. Initially, each correct peer in Q 1 receives [p ID |p addr |key|ts] from p. The time stamp ts is chosen by p and peers in Q 1 will acquiesce to the value if it agrees with the rule set to within some bound to compensate for clock drift. If the request does not violate the rule set, then the information is signed allowing p to form
In the second step of the protocol, p knows the membership of Q 2 and selects a peer q 2 ∈ Q 2 uniformly at random (u.a.r.) without replacement. Peer p then sends M 1 to q 2 . Assuming q 2 is correct, it verifies M 1 using K Q 1 and checks that the ts is valid; the duration for which a time stamp is valid would be specified by the rule set. Once verified q 2 sends p the infor- 
Here [K Q 1 ] kQ 2 will allow some peer in Q 3 to verify K Q 1 and M 1 , while the signed verified K Q 3 will allow p to check the response from that peer in Q 3 .
This process repeats with minor changes for the remaining steps. Using RT Q3 from the previous step, p selects a peer q 3 randomly from Q 3 and sends M 2 . Since Q 3 is linked with Q 2 in the quorum topology, q 3 knows K Q 2 , which it uses to verify [K 
This process continues until m is delivered. Figure 4 gives the pseudocode for RCP-II. Every peer contacted by p verifies a chain of certificates, which can be converted into a single signature using the concept of aggregate signatures [41] .
It is possible that p chooses a Byzantine peer that may not respond. In that case, after some appropriate time interval, while (p does not have M i and has waited time ∆ since previous selection) do 5: p sends M i−1 to q ∈ Q i selected u.a.r. without replacement.
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] kQ i are received from any peer in Q i previously selected) then 7: p uses K Q i to verify K Q i+1 , RT Qi+1 and
if (K Q i+1 , RT Qi+1 and K Q i−1 are all verified) then 9:
Step: 10: p sends M ℓ−1 to D ⊆ Q ℓ along with m.
RCP-II: RECEIVING PEER q Initial
Step:
q checks that p's request is legitimate and, if so, sends its signature share. Intermediate Steps: 3: if (q ∈ Q i receives M i−1 from p) then 4: for j = i − 1 downto 1 do 5: q uses K Q j to verify K Q j−1 .
6:
Peer q uses K Q 1 to verify M 1 .
7:
if verification is successful then 8: p will select an additional peer in the quorum. Let X be a random variable denoting the time required for a correct peer to respond. We make a weak assumption that P r[X ≤ ∆] ≥ c where ∆ is any duration of time and c > 0 is any constant probability. This does not circumscribe a particular distribution for response times; in fact, any distribution suffices, including the Poisson, exponential, and gamma distributions previously used to characterize round trip time (RTT) over the Internet. In practice, a peer p would set its own ∆ value by sampling the network using methods for estimating RTT [42] . Since there are only a constant fraction of Byzantine peers, taking the median from a sufficiently large sample will allow p to determine ∆. As p receives a response from any of the previously selected peers in Q i , this is in accordance with the weak synchrony assumption in Section III.
Lemma 2. RCP-II guarantees that m is transmitted to a
target set of peers D ⊆ Q i for some quorum Q i over a path of length ℓ with the following properties:
• Both the total message complexity and the message complexity of the sending peer is each at most 2 · s + (ℓ−2)
• Each non-sending peer has expected message complexity at most
(1−ǫ)·c + 2. For our proof, refer to our extended version [18] . While latency is measured in communication rounds, the time for executing RCP-II depends on ∆ and we discuss this briefly. Accounting for the response time incurred in the intermediate steps, p waits for at most time ∆ (1−ǫ)·c per step in expectation (again, see [18] ). Since peer p will have knowledge of the response time distribution, p may optimize performance by selecting ∆ so that ∆ c is minimized. Spamming Attacks: Due to the iterative nature of RCP-II, p sends more messages than other participating peers, but not to the degree seen in RCP-I. Instead of making it expensive for p to perform robust communication, RCP-II uses the following two properties to deter spamming: (1) it is inexpensive for a correct peer to detect spam and (2) the congestion suffered by a correct peer is low since the number of messages is not magnified by the use of quorums.
To address our first point, p may launch as many robust communication operations as the rule set allows; p may even try to circumvent the rule set by directly sending to a correct peer q; however, it is inexpensive for q to verify that the proof being sent is invalid. The operation terminates at that point since q will not reply. In contrast to the passive scenario of Section III-E, q need not keep a history to judge the legitimacy of a request; it simply verifies the accompanying certificate.
Our second point, and a key difference between RCP-I and RCP-II, is that with RCP-II an operation incurs only expected O(ℓ) messages which compares favourably to a system without a quorum topology. Therefore, the congestion caused by such requests is not significantly magnified by the use of quorums which was a key concern regarding spamming.
Adversarial peers may misbehave in other ways with many of the same consequences and remedies as discussed in RCP-I. Even with a generous upper bound on the expiration of ts, the congestion p can cause with a replay attack is again limited since only p can use the certificate. A notable attack, unique to RCP-II, occurs when a faulty peer gives p stale routing table information. Since entries are signed and time stamped, we are guaranteed that in the fairly recent past, the location indicated by the stale information was indeed correct. This fact, coupled with the standard assumption that ID collisions do not occur, guarantees that the adversary cannot engineer a situation where requests are forwarded to a faulty peer. Consequently, the impact of this attack is limited. The search path may be slightly lengthened by forwarding to an older location. Alternatively, stale information may point to a peer that no longer exists or is not the correct recipient, which forces p to backtrack one hop. These cases are handled easily, but for ease of exposition, they are not treated in our pseudocode in Figure 4 . In short, routing integrity is not compromised. The fact that routing tables can be signed periodically every several minutes without significant CPU cost (see Section V) implies that the impact of such an attack is negligible.
C. Membership Updates
We discuss the implications of membership changes: RCP-I: Consider a quorum Q i to which a new peer is added. The membership update protocol of DKG [40] is executed to redistribute the shares of the public/private quorum key pair over all members of Q i . In the process, the individual public/private key shares are also updated. Notably, no other quorums are affected by this process as the quorum key pair remains the same and the individual key shares need only be known to members of Q i . When a peer leaves Q i , the departure can be treated as a crash and, so long as the number of crashes does not exceed the crash-limit f , the DKG protocol need not be executed. We use this to associate the system churn rate to the session time of the DKG system. A membership update may also lead to modification in the crash limit f or the security threshold t. This can be handled using the group modification agreement of the DKG protocol [40] . Note that the adversary may crash some of its t nodes, and in principle, the system can handle t + f node leaves. However, we cannot associate these additional t crashes with the system churn due to the inherent arbitrary nature of Byzantine peers. In terms of signature generation, a quorun can sign messages as long as any t + 1 of n − t honest nodes are up.
RCP-II:
When a peer q joins Q i , the DKG protocol needs to be executed as in the case of RCP-I; however, there are additional costs due to the need to update and re-sign the routing table information. In particular, not only do the peers in Q i need to update and have signed their routing table information (to reflect the addition of q), all quorums to which Q i is linked under the quorum topology also need to update and re-sign their routing table information; note that this does not require any revocation since the public key does not change.Therefore, a join event under this scheme does affect other quorums. When a peer leaves Q i , the DKG protocol may need to be executed as in the case of RCP-I. However, routing table information for Q i and the quorums to which it links must again update and re-sign their routing table information. Therefore, while RCP-II reduces message complexity, the cost of join/leave operations is higher in comparison to RCP-I.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We examine the performance of DKG and our two protocols on the PlanetLab platform [43] . Based on our experimental results and known churn rates, we propose parameters for DHTs using our protocols.
A. Implementation and Microbenchmarks
The DKG protocol is a crucial component of our protocols. It is required to initiate a threshold signature system in a quorum and to securely manage membership changes. We use a C++ implementation [44] . We incorporate threshold BLS signatures into this implementation and realize our two protocols using this setup on PlanetLab.
Distributed Key Generation:
We test the DKG implementation for quorum sizes s = 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 and present median completion times and median CPU usage in Table  I . The median completion periods vary from 6 seconds for s = 10 to more than 5 minutes for s = 30. The bulk of this latency is due to network delays; in contrast, the required CPU time is far smaller than the completion periods.
In the next subsection, we examine the feasibility of these completion periods. Our DKG experiments assume that 30% of the peers may crash and 10% of the peers may be Byzantine. While we can tolerate any fraction of Byzantine peers less than 1/3, we use these numbers since in many practical scenarios we expect the fraction of Byzantine faults to be less than 10% and modest compared to the fraction of crash failures. RCP-I and RCP-II: For our RCP-I and RCP-II experiments, we set s = 30, t = 3, and f = 10. In RCP-I, a node requires 0.14 seconds on average to obtain a threshold signature from a quorum, if all of the obtained signature shares are correct. The average execution time increases to 0.23 seconds in case of a share corruption attack. Extrapolating to a path length ℓ, an operation should take 0.14 ·ℓ to 0.23 ·ℓ seconds on average. For a DHT with 10 5 nodes, the average total time for RCP-I is then 3 to 4 seconds with ℓ = 20.
In RCP-II, a node takes 0.04 seconds on average to obtain the required signed public keys and the signed routing information from a correct peer. A single signature verification takes 0.004 seconds on average. The median latency value over Planetlab is roughly 0.08 seconds [45] ; ∆ = 0.08 seconds for c = 0.5. With a chain of signed public keys of length ℓ, the total communication time is 0.14 + 0.04
which for 10% Byzantine peers, is 4.68 seconds in expectation. To a first-approximation, the execution times of our protocols seem quite reasonable. System Load: We address the issue of system load under the assumption that signature verification is the most significant computational operation. We make back-of-the-envelope calculations to obtain the expected order of magnitude for our performance figures. For RCP-I, from the above discussion, each signature verification takes 0.004 seconds; thus, the total CPU time required per execution is 0.004 · ℓ · (1 + s + s 2 ); this includes the costs due to share corruption attacks. For ℓ = 20 and s = 30, this value is 75 CPU seconds, spread out over 600 nodes. Therefore, the number of executions of RCP-I that can be started per second on average is n/75 ≈ 10 3 when n = 10 5 . Note this rate value is for the entire system. Now, if no share corruption attacks occur, the total CPU time required per execution becomes 0.004 · ℓ · (1 + s) which, for the same parameter values, is 2.5 CPU seconds. This implies that 4 · 10 4 executions can be started per second on average in the entire system. For RCP-II, the total CPU time required for execution is given by 0.004· ℓ + (ℓ−1)·ℓ 2·(1−ǫ) which, for the same parameters and ǫ = 1/10 is roughly 1 CPU second on average. Therefore, approximately 10 5 executions can be started per second on average in the entire system.
B. Analysis and Discussion
As mentioned in Section III-A, important questions remain with regards to translating theoretical results to a practical setting. In particular, two quantities of interest are the size of quorums, s, and the number of quorums to which each peer belongs, n Q . Unfortunately, pinning down these quantities is non-trivial. Only asymptotic analysis is present in the literature. Furthermore, it is not a simple case of substituting hard numbers because s depends on a number of parameters: (1) the exact guarantees being made, (2) algorithms for quorum maintenance, (3) the tools of analysis (i.e. form of Chernoff bounds used) and many more. Evaluating these parameters is outside the scope of this work. Instead, we assume a range of values for s and n Q . As our protocols appear to be the most efficient to date, the following results illuminate what currently seems possible in practice.
System Churn and DKG:
The performance of our two protocols will likely depend on system churn. A common metric for measuring the degree of churn is session time: the time between when a node joins the network and when it leaves [46] . As discussed in Section III-E, we make the standard assumption that the cost of joining the network is large enough so as to prevent the adversary from substantially increasing the rate of churn through rapid rejoin operations.
Part I -An Argument for Batching: Investigations have yielded differing measurements for median session times. The Kazaa system was found to have a median session time of 144 seconds [47] . In the Gnutella and Napster networks, the median session time was measured to be approximately 60 minutes [48] . Measurements of the Skype P2P network yielded a median session time of 5.5 hours for super-peers [49] . Here, we temporarily assume a median session time of 60 minutes and a standard Poisson model of peer arrivals/departures as in [46] , [50] . To calculate churn rate, r (number of arrivals/departures per second), based on the median session time t med (in seconds), we use the formula of [46] : r = (n·ln 2)/t med . For n = 10 5 and t med = 3600 seconds, r ≈ 19. Assuming that join and leave events occur independently of each other, Table II gives the expected number of seconds, r Q , at which point a quorum will undergo a membership change when each peer belongs to n Q quorums. Our choice of n Q ≤ 3 is based upon the reasonable assumption that overlap occurs only with immediate neighboring quorums in the ID space.
In several cases, the r Q values are less than the corresponding median DKG completion times in Table I . Therefore, a quorum may not be able to execute DKG often enough to accommodate each membership change. However, join operations can be queued and performed in batches. Executing DKG for a batch of joins does not increase the message complexity and message size increases only linearly in the batch size (see [40, Sec. 6] ). Therefore, batching can mitigate the effects of churn and it seems plausible that peers would tolerate some delay in joining in exchange for security.
Part II -Batching and the Security Threshold: Batching join events improves performance; however, many peers might leave a quorum before a new batch is added, thus violating the security threshold. Hence, we are interested in the session time value required such that this is not likely to occur. Based on Table I for s = 20 and n Q = 1, DKG completes within 68 seconds. The number of leave events a quorum can suffer while not exceeding the crash limit is f = 6. If Byzantine peers leave, more crashes are tolerable; however, identifying such events is impossible, so we assume the worst case of f = 6. Assuming DKG executes every r DKG = 1200 seconds, we seek the median session time such that at most 6 peers leave the system within 1268 seconds. With n/s = 5000 quorums in the system, each experiencing 6 leave events within 1268 seconds, the system churn rate is r = 23.7. This gives t med = 2930 or, equivalently, 49 minutes. Therefore, with this t med , we expect the system to remain secure. Moreover, a quorum only spends 68/1268 = 5.4% of the time executing DKG.
Certain parameters can be tuned to offer performance tradeoffs. Decreasing r DKG yields smaller required median session times; however, the percentage of time spent on DKG increases. Such tuning would depend on the desired system performance, the application, and s and n Q . Table III gives session time calculations for other values of s, r DKG and n Q .
Required session times increase with s. Notably, for s = 30 and n Q = 1, t med does not far exceed the 60 minutes in [48] . As n Q increases, the required session times grow linearly. However, our maximum of 3.7 hours is still less than t med measured for super-peers in the Skype network [49] . We tentatively conclude that our protocols can be deployed in applications where session times range from 10 minutes to a few hours and that such applications currently exist.
VI. FUTURE WORK
The performance of a complete system is an important open question. The quorum topology chosen is crucial and optimizing this in practice is a topic of future work. While we focus on DHTs, our results may apply to other P2P designs and more general settings where groups of machines, some with untrustworthy members, must communicate; it would be of interest to identify such applications.
